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Article text: 
 
Although European states such as Norway or Switzerland have different kinds of 
relationships with the EU, they are all becoming increasingly integrated into it, 
without any formal say, write Erik Oddvar Eriksen and John Erik Fossum. They argue 
that these states have given up national sovereignty without any compensation at 
EU level, and that the UK’s debate should be mindful of the hegemonic nature of 
relations between the EU and its closely associated non-members. 
 
The UK’s decision to hold an in-out referendum on EU membership is a momentous 
one. It is a major fork in the road that could reshape the map of Europe. The 
ambiguity of Britain’s relationship with the EU is not new. Even when the UK was 
‘out’ (1950-1973), it did not want to be completely ‘out’. Ever since it has been ‘in’ 
(1973-now), it has never been completely ‘in’ such processes as monetary union. 
 
Yet for a long time, there was at least a stable core of agreement in the UK that it 
should – one way or another – retain access to the EU’s single market. Now even 
that has been put into question by those advocates of Brexit who argue that the UK 
should be prepared to settle for a looser free trade agreement, rather than accept 
the regulation and ‘loss of sovereignty’ implied by continued participation as a non-
Member State in the single market. 
 
Forms of EU Association 
 
It is easy to forget that the EU has been quite responsive to the UK’s ambivalence, 
in permitting both opt-outs and opt-ins. The ensuing EU internal differentiation is 
also reflected in the EU’s associations with non-members, which range from the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), to Turkey’s customs union, to Switzerland’s 
bilateral approach, to the multilateral European Economic Area agreement (EEA) for 
Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein. 
 
These are not only different degrees of institutionalisation. They also offer different 
degrees of market access and ‘market citizenship’ – in other words, different 
degrees of legal certainty and protection. An important observation here is that, 
given the EU’s internal pressures (demands for special status and opt outs), the EU 
has been trying to reduce the range of forms of external association, not the least 
to protect its internal coherence. 
 
The Problem of Hegemony 
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The main finding of our book The European Union’s Non-Members: Independence 
under hegemony? worth underlining here is that non-EU states – whether affiliated 
through sectoral bilateral agreements such as Switzerland or multilateral dynamic 
agreements such as Iceland and Norway – are increasingly closely associated to a 
constantly changing and integrating entity over which they have no formal say. 
 
They relinquish sovereignty in a way which is not recompensed by co-
determination. This has two important implications with direct bearings on the UK 
debate. First, even if non-members such as Norway and Switzerland have 
established formally different arrangements with the EU, the effects are 
nevertheless remarkably similar. Second, the EU’s closely associated non-members 
exist under a form of self-inflicted hegemony. The interesting point is that this 
problem becomes more manifest the closer, more formalised, the association is. 
 
A hegemon wields power over other subordinate states. It dominates by interfering 
in zones of autonomy and by limiting the subordinates’ sovereignty. There is a 
profound irony in applying this notion to the European Union. After all, the 
integration process was initiated to abolish political rivalry and hegemony in Europe 
by granting the states equal membership in the fledgling European political order. 
 
The EU dominates those associated states from outside neither intentionally nor by 
deception nor by manipulation. It is hegemony by default – by rejecting EU 
membership, they have become subjected to hegemonic dominance. These states 
have unintentionally turned the EU into a hegemon vis-à-vis themselves. 
 
Norway as a Rule-Taker 
 
Take Norway as an example. In 1994, the most important argument against EU 
membership concerned the right to self-determination, popular rule and 
democracy.  But every government since then has brought Norway closer to the EU, 
and a number of additional parallel agreements have been signed. 
 
These include agreements on border controls (the Schengen Agreement), asylum 
and police cooperation. Norway even puts troops at the disposal of the EU’s battle 
groups. Approximately three-fourths of the legislation that applies to the Member 
States applies to Norway. 
 
In order to ensure the conformity of the internal market, the same rules apply to 
the EEA partners as to the EU countries (under the homogeneity principle). New 
agreements have been established over time, and existing agreements have been 
developed and expanded. Their cumulative effects are comprehensive and not well 
understood. 
 
When considering the sheer volume of agreements, and the establishment of new 
EU authorities and agencies to which Norway cedes sovereignty, the implications for 
national independence and democracy are severe. Norway has relinquished 
sovereignty in a number of areas through regular majority voting by EU members. It 
pays (through EEA financial contributions) for access to the single market, and is 
subject to much of EU law on the same basis as the EU’s Member States. 
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Norway has surrendered sovereignty without having received anything in return in 
the form of co-determination that EU membership would have granted. The slogan 
‘no taxation without representation’ from the US War of Independence does not 
apply here.  
 
If then, the EU is not in itself structured as a hegemon in relation to its Member 
States, in what sense more specifically is the relationship with the associated states 
a matter of hegemony? 
 
Implications for the UK Debate 
 
This question appears to have a direct bearing on the UK debate, which should focus 
more closely on the factors that make this into a relationship of hegemony. One 
obvious factor is that the relationship is a highly lopsided or asymmetrical power 
relationship, where one side is far more dependent on the other than the reverse. 
The bargaining power of Norway or Iceland is weak. For the UK, the question is 
whether its size and strength can make up for the difference. 
 
A second factor is that hegemony is in a deeper sense institutionalised. One aspect 
is that the EU reconfigures state sovereignty in terms of placing a stronger 
emphasis on co-determination.  The EU copes with any need to constrain 
participating states by offering them the opportunity to participate together in the 
co-determination of policies in exchange for constraints on their individual 
sovereignty. 
 
However – if countries, for whatever reason – end up adopting EU policies without 
being full members of the EU – they can end up experiencing the individual loss of 
autonomy without the compensating participation in the Union’s processes of co-
determination through shared decision-making. 
 
Since that onus on co-determination clearly also includes constitutional questions, 
then lack of access to these bodies, notably the European Council, also entails lack 
of influence on the processes that determine the associated state’s scope and terms 
of self-determination. The structure of the association is such that the closer it is, 
the more the EU determines the conditions for democratic self-rule in the 
associated non-Member States.  
 
A third factor is that the EEA Agreement is a dynamic framework agreement which 
does not need to be renegotiated whenever the EU adopts a new regulation. The 
Agreement is continually updated so that laws and regulations remain consistent 
throughout the EEA. This dynamic aspect is important for achieving the core aim: 
the maintenance of a homogeneous market throughout the whole area. Even the 
Swiss relationship is far more dynamic in practice than its formal bilateral 
arrangements would suggest. 
 
Non-members, to a much greater degree than members, experience new EU treaties 
or reforms as ‘shocks’ that they, for want of access to the EU, are far less prepared 
to handle. These factors add a great measure of uncertainty to the dynamism: the 
ability to foresee or predict is very low and that is a distinct problem facing non-
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members. From the point of view of the associated states, barred as they are from 
co-determining, enlargements increase asymmetry and also arbitrariness. 
 
The Cost of Exit 
 
European states that are interwoven into the European economy, but have chosen 
not to become EU members, are faced with the choice of legal certainty (EEA 
membership) or arbitrariness. The former entails hegemonic submission. The latter, 
however, does not imply independence but arbitrary dominance, due to the high 
degree of interdependence. 
 
For any of the associated non-members, the cost of exit is high because there is a 
very high degree of connectivity. The general feeling is that uncertainty is greater 
without an agreement. The EU reaches into almost all policy fields of the Member 
States and these horizontal dynamics are also important both in the Nordic region 
and for Switzerland. In that sense, the EEA arrangement is not merely an 
international contract regulating a specific area of common interest. 
 
What is peculiar about the form of dominance that the associated non-members 
experience is that it is both structural and at the same time voluntary. It is an 
arrangement that accidentally inhibits and intimidates the parties. The 
management of externalities and collective action problems created by 
interdependence is skewed by a European political order in favour of full members 
of the EU. By being excluded from common decision-making procedures, the 
citizens of the associated states find themselves as second-rate Europeans. 
 
Precisely the question of second-rate status takes on added importance at a time of 
crisis-induced transformation in Europe. Crisis leads to more uncertainty and 
unpredictability, thus increased dominance. How the EU grapples over time with the 
fallout of the crisis will therefore be fundamentally important for the associated 
states, as well as for a potential Brexit. 
 
This article draws from the authors’ recent book, The European Union’s Non-
Members: Independence under hegemony? (London: Routledge, 2015). 
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